Robustness surfaces of complex networks by Manzano, Marc et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
40
4.
24
03
v2
  [
cs
.SI
]  
28
 Ju
n 2
01
4
Robustness surfaces of complex networks
Marc Manzano1,†,‡, Faryad Sahneh2, Caterina Scoglio2,
Eusebi Calle1, Jose Luis Marzo1,2
1Department of Architecture and Computers Technology, University of Girona, Spain
2Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Kansas State University, USA
Abstract
Despite the robustness of complex networks has been extensively studied in the
last decade, there still lacks a unifying framework able to embrace all the proposed
metrics. In the literature there are two open issues related to this gap: (a) how to
dimension several metrics to allow their summation and (b) how to weight each of
the metrics. In this work we propose a solution for the two aforementioned problems
by defining the R∗-value and introducing the concept of robustness surface (Ω). The
rationale of our proposal is to make use of Principal Component Analysis (PCA). We
firstly adjust to 1 the initial robustness of a network. Secondly, we find the most
informative robustness metric under a specific failure scenario. Then, we repeat the
process for several percentage of failures and different realizations of the failure process.
Lastly, we join these values to form the robustness surface, which allows the visual
assessment of network robustness variability. Results show that a network presents
different robustness surfaces (i.e., dissimilar shapes) depending on the failure scenario
and the set of metrics. In addition, the robustness surface allows the robustness of
different networks to be compared.
The study of complex networks has attracted significant attention in the past decade. Critical infras-
tructures such as power grids, telecommunication networks or transportation networks, among others,
are complex networks which are omnipresent and play a pivotal role in ensuring the smooth functioning
of modern day living. These networks have to constantly deal with failures of their components, hence,
any disruption of the service provided might have a considerable impact upon sizable proportions of the
world’s inhabitants. Thus, understanding not only the structure, but also the dynamics of such networks
is of paramount importance.
Failures can be classified as being either random (i.e., accidental) or intentional (also referred to as
targeted or deliberated) [1,2]. Accidental failures occur as a result of random actions on network elements
(e.g., human-made errors or natural disasters). In contrast, in intentional attacks components are chosen
according to some criterion in order to maximize the impact of the failures (e.g., a Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attack). We define a failure scenario as the pair given by a specific type of failure (e.g., node or
link) and a given attack strategy (e.g., random or intentional).
For network engineers and operators it is crucial to quantify the tolerance of a network to a given
failure scenario. Robustness is defined as the ability of a network to maintain its total throughput under
node or link removal [3, 4].
Robustness metrics have been evolving since the advent of network science. Initially, several works
studied the robustness of complex networks by considering a single graph metric: efficiency [5], average
shortest-path length [6, 7], diameter [8], clustering coefficient [6, 9], node and link connectivity [10],
heterogeneity [11], two-terminal reliability [12], assortativity [13], betweenness centrality [14], among
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others. Later on, new metrics were proposed in order to capture advanced characteristics (i.e., by
means of spectral graph theory): symmetry ratio [15], algebraic connectivity [16] or spectral radius [17].
Furthermore, other works presented more contemporary metrics which were based on classical graph
features. For instance, the authors of [18] studied the robustness in terms of flow diversity, a metric
based on the shortest-path length. More recently, generic procedures to capture the robustness of a
network for the whole spectrum of possible failures have been presented. Metrics such as elasticity [3]
or endurance [2] quantify the robustness of a network according to a single throughput parameter.
Trajanovski et al., have proposed a framework to evaluate the robustness of complex networks, which is
based on the generic metric R-value [19]. From now on, we will use the conventions defined in Table 1.
According to [20], the R-value is denoted by:
R =
n∑
k=1
sktk (1)
where s and t are n× 1 weight and graph metric vectors, respectively, and n is the number of robustness
metrics. Thus, the R-value includes several graph metrics characterizing network robustness. However,
there are two open issues related to the normalization of the t metrics:
1. How to unify the dimensionality of each robustness metric of vector t in order to legitimate their
summation.
2. How to define the weight of each metric to optimally extract the most significant information.
In this work we propose a solution for the two aforementioned problems by defining the R∗-value and
introducing the concept of robustness surface (Ω). The former extracts the most informative robustness
metric for a failure scenario, while the latter allows network robustness variations of different networks
to be visually assessed, regardless of the failure scenario.
Results
R∗-value. The rationale of our proposal is to make use of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) (see
Methods). Given a set of robustness metrics t, we first define the initial robustness as follows:
R∗init =
n∑
k=1
vˆkt
0
k = 1 (2)
where t0 is the set of metrics when no failures occur, and vˆ is a normalized eigenvector or Principal
Component (PC). We obtain vˆ from the procedure that computes the robustness surface (see following
subsection and Eq. 4). The fact that vˆ is normalized makes R∗init equal to 1. Additionally, R
∗ can be
computed when p% of elements fail as denoted next:
R∗p =
n∑
k=1
vˆkt
p
k (3)
where tpk is the set of metrics computed when p% of failures occur. R
∗
p takes values in the interval [0,+∞).
The difference between R∗ and R (Eq. 1) is that in our proposal the principal component vˆ gives
dimension and non-arbitrary weights to each of the metrics. In addition, besides finding the most
informative robustness metric, we adjust the initial robustness to 1, thus simplifying the comparison of
network robustness variations when failures occur.
Robustness surface (Ω). The robustness surface allows the network performance variability for a
given failure scenario to be visually assessed.
In fact, Ω is a matrix where the rows are the percentage of failures (P ) and the columns are the
distinct failure configurations (m). The list of percentage of failures P (e.g., P = {1%, 2%..100%})
denotes the range of failures for which the robustness is evaluated. A failure configuration represents a
realization of the failure process. The different failure configurations m depict the different subsets of
elements that fail for a given percentage of failures, with each subset being distinct from one another.
The robustness value in Ω[p][i], where p ∈ {1%..|P |%} and i ∈ {1..m}, is given by R∗p (Eq. 3).
To obtain the robustness surface of a network given a failure scenario (e.g., node and random), we
define the following procedure:
1. Let Ap be an m × n matrix where p ∈ {1%..|P |%} is the percentage of failure. The goal is
to transform Ap into a smaller data set, i.e., a vector ωp of size m, while preserving the most
significant information. Therefore, we define ωp as a vector of size m× 1. ωp contains the set of m
values R∗p computed when p% of elements fail.
2. To do so, we first compute the covariance matrix Cp of each matrix Ap. Then, we average the |P |
covariance matrices to obtain a unique matrix C¯. This allows us to obtain a PC independent of p.
3. We calculate the eigenvectors V and the eigenvalues D of C¯. At this point, the l most relevant
eigenvectors of V are taken as the principal components for each matrix Ap (seeMethods for further
details). Hereafter we assume that l = 1, i.e., v is the eigenvector PC.
4. Then, we obtain vˆ by normalizing v:
vˆj =
vj∑n
k=1 t
0
kvk
j ∈ {1..n} (4)
5. By multiplying the principal component vˆ by each row of Ap we obtain a vector ωp of size m. Each
value of ωp is, indeed, R
∗
p. Next, by iterating this procedure for all matrices Ap, we obtain a set of
|P | vectors ωp. Finally, we define ω
′
p as a vector ωp sorted in decreasing order. Consequently, the
robustness surface is given by the following expression Ω = {ω′
1%
, ..., ω′|P |%}.
Although different failure scenarios (e.g, link random and link by betweenness centrality) provide
different vˆ, each of them satisfies Eq. 2 because vˆ is normalized (as shown in Eq. 4).
Case study. Here, we illustrate the suitability of our proposal for evaluating the robustness when
considering several metrics. To do so, we study two real critical infrastructures: the Spanish railway
network (sprailway) [21] and the European power grid network (europg) [22].
We consider incremental and irreversible random and targeted attacks (e.g., betweenness centrality
(BC) or node degree). Link and node failures are considered for the sprailway and europg, respectively,
to show that the robustness surface allows us to compare network robustness independently from the
failure scenario. Link failures are caused randomly and by link BC, whereas node failures are caused
randomly, by node degree, the clustering coefficient and node BC. In both cases, |P | is set to 70, i.e.,
from 1% to 70% of failures. The presented results are obtained for 500 and 100 runs (m) for random
and targeted attacks, respectively. For each of the runs, a different realization of the failure process is
considered, i.e., a distinct subset of elements that fail according to the failure scenario.
We consider the following metrics: the largest connected component (LCC), the degree of fragmenta-
tion as a function of the number of connected components (only applicable to link failures), the average
nodal degree, the two-terminal reliability, the average clustering coefficient, the average shortest-path
length, the diameter, the average node BC, the average link BC and the algebraic connectivity. Therefore,
link failures have n = 10 while node failures have n = 9.
Table 2 presents the main characteristics of the two networks considered. Although both networks
have a different number of nodes and links, they show a similar average node degree 〈k〉, which is between
2 and 3. However, europg has a higher node maximum degree, what means that such a network is more
vulnerable to targeted attacks. The average shortest-path length 〈l〉 depicts that europg is about two
times wider than sprailway. Finally, both networks have a negative value of assortativity (r), which
means that nodes of dissimilar degrees are connected to each other.
Numerical results. The results of our work are presented in Figures 1 and 2. The x-axes show
the different failure configurations for which the n metrics have been computed. The y-axes depict the
range of percentage of failures (from 1% to 70%). At each coordinate (x,y), i.e., for each percentage
of failures and for each subset of elements that fail, the R∗p-value is shown. In each figure the range of
colors expresses variability, with dark blue and dark red being the two extremes of each failure scenario
intervals. Since R∗init = 1, i.e., the initial robustness is set to 1 regardless of the set of n chosen metrics,
our results allow a visual assessment of the robustness variation with respect to the initial conditions.
The further the value of R∗p is with respect to R
∗
init, the lower the performance of the network is. When
R∗p is close to 0, the performance is considered to be totally deteriorated. Moreover, it is possible to
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(a) sprailway random
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(b) sprailway link betweenness centrality
Figure 1: Robustness surface Ω of sprailway when causing links to fail randomly and by link BC.
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(a) europg random
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(b) europg node betweenness centrality
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(c) europg node degree
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(d) europg node clustering coefficient
Figure 2: Robustness surface Ω of europg when causing nodes to fail randomly, by node BC, by node
degree and by the clustering coefficient.
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Figure 3: Robustness summary of sprailway and europg under the different failure scenarios. As to the
legend, L refers to link failures, whereas N refers to nodes.
observe R∗p = 1 when p ≥ 1%, and the LCC of the network has similar properties to the initial network
(without failures).
Figure 1 presents the robustness surface Ω of sprailway in the case of random (Fig.1a) and link
BC failures (Fig.1b). Interestingly, the random case provides a smooth surface, while the targeted case
presents abrupt slopes. The latter is worth noting, because the presence of abrupt slopes in the robustness
surface means that there are network elements (in this case, links) that could be protected in order to
improve the overall network robustness.
In the case of europg, Fig. 2 depicts four robustness surfaces under different node failure scenarios.
Similar to sprailway, the random surface depicts a regular behavior. In addition, the targeted-based
cases depict rough surfaces. While Figs. 2b and 2c depict that europg is not robust under node degree or
node BC failure scenarios, Fig. 2d shows that the network keeps the initial robustness until more than
30% of the nodes have failed. This implies that europg is significantly more robust under failures by the
clustering coefficient than by other targeted strategies.
For some failure configurations, it is worth noting that R∗p might increase at some percentage of
failures with respect to R∗init, as observed in 10% or 20% of failures in Fig. 1a and in 20% or 30% in
Fig. 2a, as well as in the targeted-based surfaces. This result should not be misleading because it totally
depends on the set of metrics that are being considered for the study. For instance, while some metrics
might decrease as the percentage of failures increases, others might alternate increments and decrements
because they depend on the number and size of largest connected components (i.e., average shortest-
path length, diameter, algebraic connectivity, etc.). Therefore, the suitability of the robustness surface
remains intact, because the variability of the robustness can be assessed in any case.
Finally, to compare the robustness surfaces of both networks, and considering the different failure
scenarios, we average the values of each ω′p of Ω. Thus, for each network and failure scenario, we obtain
|P | R¯∗p-values. Fig. 3 depicts a summary of the results. Fig. 3a shows the curves of R¯
∗
p of both networks
from 1% to 70% of failures. To complement the results in Fig. 3a, the variance is presented in Fig. 3b.
For instance, it can be observed that both random failure scenarios show similar behaviors, although for
europg the top of the curve is around 24% of failures. Therefore, our approach allows us to compare
different networks, regardless of the failure scenarios. This comparison could be done numerically, for
instance, by comparing the areas below the curves.
Discussion
In this work we present the R∗-value and the concept of robustness surface (Ω). The rationale of our
proposal is to make use of Principal Component Analysis (PCA).
The R∗-value solves two open issues in the robustness of complex networks field. Our proposal
extracts the most significant information from a set of robustness metrics. R∗ is the first generic metric
able to characterize the robustness of complex networks with a single value, while taking into account
several robustness metrics.
The robustness surface Ω provides a framework to visually assess the network robustness variability.
Moreover, it allows for the comparison of the robustness between different networks under distinct failure
scenarios. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first method of its kind to allow the visual evaluation
of the network robustness for a specific failure scenario, while at the same time considering several
robustness metrics.
Robustness surfaces are designed as a visual monitoring tool. First, our approach is applicable to
real-time monitoring of a network through a single value, when it is otherwise implemented according to
multiplicity of correlated metrics with possible inherent redundancy. Second, Ω can be a pivotal part of
a network robustness refinement process:
• Step 1: If the robustness surface presents abrupt slopes, then there are network elements (nodes
or links) which are weaker than the rest, for a given failure scenario. These elements could be
identified by means of traditional robustness metrics such as the betweenness centrality.
• Step 2: Enhance or protect the weak elements, for instance, by adding new links or applying
immunization techniques.
• Step 3: Re-evaluate the robustness of a network and, instead of comparing a large number of
robustness metrics, detect through visual inspection if the network robustness has been improved.
We believe that the contributions presented in this work will lay a firm foundation for future research
on the robustness of complex networks.
To conclude, the R∗-value shows that there is no single and universal robustness metric for a network.
Instead, the robustness varies according to the failure scenario and the metrics that are used to quantify
the performance of the network.
For future work, we plan to study the stability of the robustness surfaces with respect to network
size scaling.
Methods
Principal Component Analysis (PCA). PCA is a powerful tool to identify the most significant
information in a data table representing observations described by several dependent variables, which
can be inherently correlated. The goals of the PCA are to: (a) extract the main information of a data
set and express it by means of new orthogonal variables called principal components; and (b) compress
the size of the data set while preserving the most important information [23].
Let A be a data set of m observations of a vector-valued variable, i.e., A ∈ Rm×n. We define C as
the covariance matrix of A, which is denoted by:
Cn×n = (ci,j , ci,j = cov(colAi , colAj )) (5)
where i, j ∈ {1..n}, and cov(colAi , colAj ) is the covariance function evaluating column i and column j.
PCA works with the spectrum of C. Let vi ∈ R
n×1{i ∈ 1..n} and λi ∈ R be the eigenvectors
and corresponding eigenvalues of the covariance matrix C, respectively. The matrix V with all vi as
columns represents the principal components, and provides an orthogonal transformation to the PC
space. Furthermore, we denote D as a matrix with the eigenvalues in its diagonal.
Let V˜ be n × l matrix, which only contains the top l of the most important principal components
(see Methods: Most relevant principal components of A for further details). Therefore, we can obtain
the transformed data ω = AV˜ .
In our problem, each failure has a covariance matrix Cp, where p is the percentage of failure. We
perform the PCA on C¯ =
∫
Cpδp, in order to obtain the PC independent of p.
Most relevant principal components of A. In order to choose the l most relevant principal
components, matrices V (eigenvectors) and D (eigenvalues) must be column-sorted in decreasing order,
according to the eigenvalues in the diagonal of D. The importance of each eigenvector is characterized
by its energy quantum g. The eigenvalues represent the distribution of the energy of A among each of
the eigenvectors. The energy quantum for the jth eigenvector is the sum of the energy quantum across
all eigenvalues from 1 to j:
g[j] =
j∑
k=i
D[k][k] j = 1..n . (6)
Let V˜ be an n × l, where l ≤ n matrix that contains the most relevant eigenvectors. Then, the
objective is to choose an l value as low as possible while preserving a reasonable high value of g on a
percentage basis. For instance, we have chosen l so that g is above a certain threshold α:
min{l ∈ [1..n] :
g[l]
g[n]
≥ α} (7)
In this work we have considered α = 0.9, from which we have obtained l = 1.
Simulation details. The computation of each metric has been done with PHISON [24]. The
simulations were performed on a Linux system with a 16-core 64-bit Intel Xeon processor of 2Ghz and
64 GB of RAM. The presented results are the average of 500 and 100 differently seeded simulation runs
for random and targeted failures, respectively. The figures have been plotted by means of the pcolor
function of MATLAB. In addition, the PCA has also been done with MATLAB.
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Table 1: Definition of the variables.
Variable Meaning
n number of robustness metrics
R R-value [20]
s vector of weights (size n× 1)
t vector of metrics (size n× 1)
m failure configurations, i.e., different realizations of the failure
process
R∗ R-value computed via Principal Components (PC)
t0 vector of metrics without failures (size n× 1)
R∗init initial R
∗-value (without failures)
v eigenvector PC (size n× 1)
vˆ normalized eigenvector PC (size n× 1)
P set of percentage of failures
p percentage of failures (p ∈ P )
tp vector of metrics when p% of elements fail
R∗p R-value when p% of elements fail
Ap m× n matrix, i.e., m values for each of the n metrics when p%
of elements fail
ωp vector of R
∗
p values (size m× 1)
ω′p vector ωp sorted in decreasing order
Cp covariance matrix of Ap (size n× n)
C¯ average of the |P | covariance matrices (size n× n)
V matrix containing n eigenvectors v
D diagonal matrix with eigenvalues (size n× n)
l number of most relevant eigenvector
Ω robustness surface, i.e., |P | vectors ω′p
Table 2: Main network characteristics. The table displays, from left to right, topology name, number
of nodes (N), number of links (L), average node degree ± standard deviation (StDev) (〈k〉), maximum
degree (kmax), average shortest-path length ± StDev (〈l〉) and assortativity (r).
topology N L 〈k〉 ± StDev kmax 〈l〉 ± StDev r
sprailway 169 190 2.24 ±1.09 8 10.49 ±4.64 -0.269
europg 1,494 2,154 2.88 ±1.75 13 18.88 ±8.73 -0.119
